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Structuring	Intervention	Decisions	to	Prevent	Genocide	and	Mass	Atrocities	
Robin	Gregory	&	Paul	Slovic1					
“Simply	put,	the	US	government	does	not	have	an	established,	coherent	policy	for	preventing				
	 and	responding	to	genocide	and	mass	atrocities”					(Albright	&	Cohen,	2008;	p.3)	
Abstract	
Drawing	on	techniques	from	decision	analysis,	psychology,	and	negotiation	analysis,	we	
highlight	a	general	approach	to	assessing	genocide	prevention	decisions	that	we	believe	could	
provide	decision	makers	with	additional	insight,	consistency,	efficiency,	and	defensibility.		We	
argue	that	the	use	of	a	consistent	decision-making	framework	would	facilitates	the	comparison	
and	review	of	choices,	with	significant	clarity	gained	through	the	simple	act	of	developing	a	
common	language	for	the	key	decision	elements	and	placing	considerations	into	an	agreed-
upon	context	and	order.		The	consequences	of	alternative	actions	can	then	be	evaluated	in	
terms	of	their	ability	to	achieve	the	identified	values,	collectively	determining	the	overall	
benefits,	costs,	and	risks	of	proposed	actions.	Properly	used,	a	decision-aiding	framework	has	
the	potential	to	improve	the	quality	of	intervention	deliberations,	laying	the	groundwork	for	a	
more	comprehensive	and	nuanced	understanding	of	the	threats	posed	to	American	values	and	
interests	using	a	common	language	for	analysis	that	facilitates	input	and	involvement	from	all	
key	parties.		
1.0.	Introduction	
The	Executive	Summary	of	the	Genocide	Prevention	Task	Force,	co-chaired	by	Madeleine	
Albright	and	William	Cohen,	begins	by	emphasizing	“	.	.	.	the	fundamental	reality	that	genocide	
and	mass	atrocities	threaten	American	values	and	interests”	(Albright	&	Cohen,	2008).	Yet	
decisions	about	whether	the	US	should	intervene	and	attempt	to	stop	genocide	taking	place	in	
another	country	are	complicated,	on	many	levels	(Power,	2002).	Such	choices	place	a	cognitive	
demand	on	decision	makers	because	they	involve	multiple	dimensions	of	value	and	a	wide	
range	of	possible	alternative	actions.	The	decision	context	typically	is	characterized	by	
numerous	constraints	including	insufficient	time,	limited	information,	and	scarce	financial	
																																								 																				
1	Our	colleagues	Michael	Harstone	and	David	Frank	have	contributed	significantly	to	our	
thinking	on	these	topics.		
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resources.	Intervention	decisions	also	involve	difficult	emotions	because	people’s	lives—foreign	
as	well	as	US	citizens—are	at	issue	and	because	decision	makers	feel	a	moral	responsibility	for	
the	outcomes	of	their	choices.		
Drawing	on	techniques	from	decision	analysis,	psychology,	and	negotiation	analysis,	we	
highlight	a	general	approach	to	assessing	genocide	prevention	decisions	that	we	believe	could	
provide	decision	makers	with	additional	insight,	consistency,	efficiency,	and	defensibility.	Our	
research	--	as	academics	and	advisors	to	governments	–has	focused	on	understanding	how	
people	both	do	and	should	make	decisions	characterized	by	multiple	dimensions	of	value,	
uncertain	consequences,	and	difficult	tradeoffs.	This	characterization	applies	to	most	decisions	
concerning	genocide	prevention	but	it	also	applies	to	a	host	of	other	tough	public	policy	choices	
facing	governments	such	as	responses	to	climate	change,	storage	of	high-level	nuclear	wastes,	
or	prevention	of	terrorism.		Each	of	these	national-level	policy	choices	is	said	to	have	an	
influence	on	“national	security”	and	the	long-term	“national	interest”—two	terms	that	often	
surface	as	part	of	discussions	of	genocide	prevention.	And	although	in	each	of	these	diverse	
policy	arenas	the	consequences	of	decisions	typically	are	subject	to	uncertainty	(and	thus	good	
outcomes	are	not	guaranteed),	appropriate	decision-making	approaches	have	the	capability	to	
improve	the	quality	of	outcomes	by	identifying	choices	that	better	align	with	and	achieve	the	
considered	interests	of	decision	makers.		As	President	Obama	stated	when	discussing	US	policies	
in	the	Middle	East,	“We	have	to	be	able	to	distinguish	between	these	problems	analytically,	so	
that	we’re	not	using	a	pliers	where	we	need	a	hammer,	and	we’re	not	using	a	battalion	when	
what	we	should	be	doing	is	partnering	with	the	local	government	.	.	.”	(Remnick,	2011).		
2.0.	A	decision-aiding	approach	
Prescriptive	decision	making	is	concerned	with	how	people	can	improve	their	choice	processes.	
As	succinctly	characterized	in	the	book	Smart	Choices	(Hammond,	Keeney	&	Raiffa	1999),	a	
recommended	decision-making	sequence	forms	the	acronym	PrOACT:	understand	the	Problem	
context,	clarify	Objectives	and	associated	measures,	define	Alternatives,	identify	their	likely	
Consequences	and	important	uncertainties,	and	highlight	key	Trade-offs.		When	used	in	an	
iterative	fashion,	cycling	back	to	re-examine	assumptions	with	shifts	in	the	importance	of	
different	objectives	or	as	new	information	becomes	available,	the	approach	is	both	rigorous	and	
links	with	the	logic	of	common	sense.			
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To	the	extent	that	similar	decisions	are	made	over	time,	the	use	of	a	consistent	decision-making	
framework	encourages	learning	because	it	facilitates	the	comparison	and	review	of	choices,	
examining	criteria	and	reasons	that	(in	hindsight)	will	turn	out	to	have	a	stronger	or	weaker	
rationale.	The	use	of	a	simplifying	structure	to	address	intervention	choices	also	has	the	benefit	
of	forcing	decision	makers	to	confront	a	paradoxical	truth:	it	is	because	the	issues	involved	in	
framing	such	choices	can	appear	overwhelmingly	difficult	that	a	simplifying	structure	is	useful.		
Without	an	organizing	structure,	the	breadth	of	concerns	involved	in	thinking	about	
interventions	to	prevent	genocide	can	effectively	serve	to	paralyze	rational	decision	making.		As	
a	result,	what	often	happens	is	that	the	difficult	becomes	(falsely)	easy	by	relying	on	habit	(what	
did	we	do	last	time?)	or	intuition	(what	is	my	gut	feeling?)?		Discussions	and	debate	may	bias	
decisions	in	favor	of	achieving	prominent	objectives	that	are	easy	to	defend,	such	as	national	
security,	without	carefully	weighing	these	against	less	prominent	or	more	uncertain	objectives,	
such	as	human	rights	or	civilian	lives	(Slovic	&	Västfjäll,	2013).		
A	structured,	decision-aiding	process	also	can	help	to	balance	the	role	of	two	main	judgmental	
mechanisms,	involving	the	automatic	and	more	thoughtful	responses	that	have	been	termed	
System	1	and	System	2—fast	and	slow—thinking	by	Kahneman	(2011)	and	others.	System	1	is	a	
fast,	automatic	system	based	on	experience	and	involving	intuition	and	feelings.	System	2	brings	
in	slower,	more	reasoned	responses	that	involve	cognition	and	analysis.	Together	these	two	
ways	of	comprehending	reality	form	the	basis	for	how	we	identify	and	make	difficult	tradeoffs;	
different	individuals,	and	likely	different	countries,	will	rely	on	different	mixtures	of	System	1	
and	System	2	inputs	when	addressing	intervention	decisions.		
A	particular	concern	with	respect	to	genocide	prevention	choices	is	that	the	fast,	automatic	
thinking	of	System	1	can	override	the	slower,	more	deliberate	thinking	of	System	2	and	lead	to	a	
reliance	on	emotional	responses	and	judgmental	shortcuts.	Although	these	“judgmental	
heuristics”	help	decision	makers	to	cope	with	the	complex	cognitive	demands	placed	on	them,	
they	can	also	open	the	door	to	a	variety	of	decision-making	biases	that	lead	individuals	to	
anchor	on	oversimplified	analogies,	to	give	insufficient	attention	to	their	own	perspective	and	
values	(thus	resulting	in	the	phenomenon	known	as	“groupthink”),	to	focus	on	one	or	two	
prominent	dimensions	of	a	choice	to	the	neglect	of	other	important	considerations,	and	to	
encourage	psychophysical	numbing	by	diminishing	sensitivity	to	meaningful	changes	in	a	
concern.	Awareness	of	these	judgmental	biases—which	research	has	shown	to	influence	the	
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choices	and	reasoning	processes	of	experts	as	well	as	laypersons—can	help	significantly	to	
improve	the	quality	of	decisions	and	aid	in	balancing	the	contributions	of	our	System	1	and	2	
inputs	to	choices.	
3.0	Structuring	Intervention	Decisions		
Our	starting	point	for	thinking	about	genocide	prevention	decisions	is	the	same	as	that	of	
Albright	and	Cohen:	identifying	the	interests	and	values	of	Americans	and	their	decision	makers	
within	a	specified	problem	context.	Although	each	situation	is	different,	all	decisions	about	
whether	to	intervene	in	a	foreign	country	to	prevent	or	reduce	genocide	and	mass	atrocities	are	
likely	to	reflect	both	an	over-riding	political	philosophy	(e.g.,	to	what	extent	do	the	President	
and	Congress	seek	to	shape	the	course	of	global	events)2	and	specific	considerations	such	as	the	
country’s	geographic	location,	its	history	and	economic	capabilities,	and	both	current	and	future	
political	realities	such	as	the	stability	of	its	current	leadership.	These	considerations	give	shape	
to	the	problem;	understanding	the	context	for	decisions	is	always	the	first	step	in	developing	
effective	decision	aids.	
Once	key	elements	of	the	intervention	decision	context	are	identified,	decision	makers	will	be	
faced	with	a	set	of	values	or	concerns	that	will	be	affected,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	
depending	on	the	choices	that	are	made.	These	values	then	need	to	be	evaluated	with	respect	
to	how	significantly	they	are	likely	to	be	impacted	by	a	broad	set	of	alternative	policies,	which	
typically	include	at	least	the	following	categories	of	responses:		diplomatic,	economic,	legal,	and	
military	(either	covert	or	overt)—all	of	which	could	be	applied	in	various	combinations,	at	
different	levels	of	intensity,	and	with	more	or	less	coordination	with	allies.		
Identifying	values	and	characterizing	policy	alternatives	is	neither	easy	nor	straightforward.	As	
people	whose	job	is	to	examine	and	help	aid	public	policy	choices,	we	have	addressed	few	issues	
not	characterized	by	their	respective	decision	makers	and	technical	experts	as	“the	most	
difficult	ever	encountered.”	Nevertheless,	substantial	insights	often	can	be	gained	simply	
through	organizing	the	various	sources	of	decision	complexity,	as	shown	in	the	following	
illustrative	listing	of	key	contextual	concerns,	values,	and	alternatives.	
																																								 																				
2		A	recent	interview	with	Samantha	Power	(Osnos,	2014)	refers	to	this	as	a	desire	to	“bend	the	
curve.”		
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• Context:	geographic	location,	history,	economic	capabilities,	leadership	stability	
• Values:	national	security,	civilian	lives	and	injuries	(US,	foreign),	military	lives	and	
injuries	(US,	foreign),	economic	costs	(intervention,	aid),	reputation	of	US	(moral,	legal,	
leadership),	regional	stability	(social,	political,	economic).	
• Alternatives:	diplomatic,	economic,	legal,	military	(covert	or	overt	–	air	strikes,	ground	
troops,	etc.)	
Significant	clarity	can	be	gained	through	the	simple	act	of	developing	a	common	language	for	
the	key	decision	elements	and	placing	considerations	into	their	proper	place	or	order—an	
organizing	or	binning	process	referred	to	as	“decision	sketching”	(Gregory	et	al.,	2012).	Each	of	
the	alternatives	will	have	different	effects	in	terms	of	their	ability	to	achieve	the	identified	
values,	and	these	consequences	will	collectively	determine	the	overall	benefits	and	costs	of	any	
selected	policy.	In	addition,	some	of	the	consequences	will	matter	more	to	some	people	than	to	
others,	which	can	help	to	shed	light	on	both	the	sources	of	agreement	among	participants	and	
their	reasons	for	disagreements.	The	balancing	of	these	different	outcomes	forms	the	basis	for	
discussions	of	trade-offs:		how	much	of	a	potential	gain	in	one	objective	is	needed	to	balance	off	
potential	losses	in	another?	
	 A	decision-aiding	approach	uses	several	specific	tools	to	help	structure	these	
discussions,	with	the	goal	of	highlighting	key	considerations	and—by	making	relationships	
among	these	decision	elements	more	transparent	—encouraging	participants	to	pay	attention	
to	areas	of	agreement	and	disagreement.	Three	tools	are	particularly	helpful.		
	 Objectives	hierarchies	provide	a	vehicle	for	identifying	and	ordering	concerns	relevant	
to	a	decision	(Keeney,	1992).		For	example,	key	values	for	intervention	decisions	to	prevent	
mass	atrocities	and	genocide	will	typically	include	effects	on	national	security	(including	both	
domestic	and	international	political	or	economic	threats),	civilian	and	military	fatalities	and	
injuries	(both	US	and	foreign),	economic	costs	of	intervention	and	aid,	effects	on	the	reputation	
of	the	US	(related	to	meeting	moral	&	legal	obligations),	and	the	anticipated	impacts	on	regional	
stability.		Each	of	these	fundamental	concerns	often	will	include	several	sub-objectives:	
“protecting	human	lives,”	for	example,	includes	both	deaths	and	injuries	that	might	affect	either	
civilians	or	members	of	the	military.	Delineating	objectives	(a)	provides	a	clear	basis	and	record	
for	identifying	what	matters	to	the	decision,	(b)	it	provides	an	explicit	and	consistent	framework	
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for	comparing	the	consequences	of	alternative	actions	or	for	generating	new,	creative	
alternatives,	and	(c)	it	allows	different	participants	to	express	the	importance	they	place	on	each	
concern,	which	often	provides	the	rationale	for	disagreements	regarding	choices.		
	 Performance	measures	establish	one	or	more	specific	metrics	(aka	attributes)	that	track	
changes	in	the	objectives	related	to	an	action.	Developing	good	measures	for	changes	to	each	
interest	is	essential	for	the	consistent	evaluation	of	alternatives	and	also	permits	clear	
communication	about	what	matters	among	the	decision	participants.		They	should	be	
understandable,	complete	(otherwise	important	concerns	are	omitted),	concise	(to	facilitate	the	
ready	comparison	of	alternatives),	direct	and	unambiguous	(to	ensure	clear	communication),	
and	measurable	(so	that	data	can	be	found	to	track	differences	among	alternatives).	Coming	up	
with	good	measures	for	some	objectives	is	relatively	easy,	for	example	using	dollars	to	measure	
cost	or	numbers	of	fatalities	for	lives	lost.	Other	important	objectives,	such	as	“national	
security”	or	“national	reputation,”	are	more	difficult	to	define—yet	deliberations	about	
intervention	options	will	be	improved	to	the	extent	that	different	intervention	alternatives	can	
be	compared	on	these	dimensions	and	all	stakeholders	are	using	the	same	working	definitions	
(Keeney	&	Gregory,	2005).		
	 Consequence	tables	are	another	key	structuring	tool	(Clemen,	2004),	used	to	emphasize	
the	link	between	the	consequences	of	actions	and	the	concerns	that	matter	the	most.		Columns	
show	the	different	intervention	alternatives	that	are	under	consideration;	rows	show	the	
different	values	that	may	be	impacted.	Each	box	of	the	table	thus	shows	what	is	likely	to	happen	
if	that	alternative	is	selected.	Consequence	tables	can	be	kept	simple	or	can	be	constructed	to	
incorporate	additional	considerations	such	as	the	existence	of	sequential	decisions,	information	
changes	over	time,	thresholds	signaling	the	need	for	possible	shifts	in	actions,	or	important	
geographic	differences	among	potentially	affected	regions.		As	noted	by	Samantha	Power:	“You	
have	to	take	into	account	the	other	collateral	issues	that	you’re	dealing	with	on	the	
international	stage”	(Osnos,	2014).		
4.0.	Moving	forward	
The	doctrine	of	responsibility	to	protect	(R2P),	articulated	in	2005,	permits	the	international	
community	to	intervene	in	the	affairs	of	a	sovereign	state	if	it	fails	to	protect	its	population	from	
mass	atrocity	crimes.	President	Obama	supported	and	strengthened	this	agreement	by	
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proclaiming,	as	part	of	Presidential	Directive	10,	the	establishment	of	the	Atrocities	Prevention	
Board	(APB)	and	by	stating	that	“Preventing	mass	atrocities	and	genocide	is	a	core	national	
security	interest	and	a	core	moral	responsibility	of	the	United	States.”	(White	House,	2011).		
Our	belief	is	that	depicting	genocide	prevention	decisions	in	terms	of	fundamental	values,	
clearly	articulated	measures	of	performance,	and	the	consequences	of	different	alternatives	can	
help	to	organize	what	is	known	about	the	predicted	consequences	of	interventions	while	
highlighting	key	information	gaps.	A	structured	decision-aiding	approach	also	has	the	capability	
to	examine	carefully	a	vague	doctrine,	such	as	“protect	the	national	interest”	or	“promote	
humanitarian	interventions,”	and	transform	it	into	an	organized	framework	that	promotes	both	
understanding	and	discussion.	Of	course,	a	decision-aiding	framework	cannot	“make”	the	tough	
choices	required	of	the	US	government	with	respect	to	interventions	intended	to	reduce	
genocide	and	mass	atrocities.	What	it	can	do	is	to	improve	the	quality	and	extent	of	intervention	
deliberations,	laying	the	groundwork	for	a	more	comprehensive	and	nuanced	understanding	of	
the	threats	posed	to	American	values	and	interests	using	a	common	language	for	analysis	that	
facilitates	input	and	involvement	from	all	key	parties.		
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